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Abstract 
The Covid-19 pandemic has ushered in an unprecedented epoch of myriad sacrifice. Unseen 
since World War Two, restrictions have been placed upon our movement at various degrees of 
intensity since March 2020. Across the world, citizenries have been informed by states to sacrifice 
their cultural freedoms to protect the sacred – namely, healthcare systems and thereby help to 
preserve life, particularly the elderly. However, little scholarly attention has been given to the 
presence of sacrifice throughout the pandemic. Therefore, this article is structured into four core 
themes. The first section outlines the moral and ethical quandaries generated by the Covid-19 
pandemic. The second section explores the theoretical work on violence, since contemporary 
sacrifice is intimately connected to the systemic violence inherent in neoliberal capitalist 
economies. Next, the paper explicates the role of sacrifice during the pandemic, particularly 
through the sacrifices made by ‘key workers’ like care workers and nurses, outlining how 
neoliberalism’s systemic violence meant they were met with tokenistic gestures including 
clapping rather than a fundamental improvement in their working conditions. As sacrifice has 
historically served to reinforce the social fabric, the article closes with a discussion on whether 
sacrifice during the pandemic is likely to achieve this, given neoliberalism’s tendency to post-
social arrangements including radical individualism, emotivism, and competition. 
 






The arrival of Covid-19 has heralded a prolonged period of great and profound sacrifice. At the 
time of writing, around 4 million deaths worldwide have been linked to the contraction of the 
virus. Initially, with no known effective treatments, management of the virus across many states 
has relied upon non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), such as the full closure or curtailing 
of economic sectors, social distancing, and confinement to domestic dwellings. Reliance upon 
these interventions has endured to varying degrees, despite the initiation of vaccination 
programmes in several countries. Non-pharmaceutical interventions demand sacrifices, and 
through their implementation many people have endured prolonged separation from family 
members and friends, as well as institutions and cultural activities that offer structure, routine, 
connections to others, meaning, purpose and identity. As Saad-Filho (2020) speculated, the 
economic shock caused by the pandemic could be ‘catastrophic’ and has already led to 
redundancies and therefore a swell in the numbers of those without work. The sacrifices cannot 
be overstated, neither can they be ignored as we seek to understand the pandemic’s impact.     
Sacrifice is inherently painful, yet often regarded as necessary in the service of a perceived 
social or communal ‘good’. Keenan (2005) suggests sacrifice denotes a process of suffering or loss 
in pursuit of a noble or ‘higher’ cause. Girard (2013:1) associates sacrifice with violence and the 
restoration of social bonds during crises, suggesting there is ‘hardly any form of violence that 
cannot be described in terms of sacrifice’. Sacrifice may be regarded as a source of ‘good’ violence 
for its role in the prevention of greater suffering (Dupuy, 2013). Halbertal (2012: 59) claims it 
‘covers immensely diverse experiences’ but can be captured within two fundamentally 
distinguished forms: sacrifice as an offer to another, or sacrifice that is for another. Sacrifice is 
readily associated with religion, particularly in the former sense of an offer made to gods or a 
deity. Yet, sacrifice for another, or in the name of a ‘higher’ cause, is fundamental to political and 
collective moral life. Sacrifices are frequently made to establish, alter or defend socio-political 
systems. Conflict arises when state’s demand sacrifices from citizens given their requirement to 
protect life, while a great burden of loyalty weighs upon those for whom sacrifices are made 
(Halbertal, 2012).  
Crucially, it is significant, as Halbertal (2012) reminds us, to recognise the diversity of 
sacrifices during the pandemic and those made in pursuit of notions of social or communal 
‘good’. Importantly though, sacrifice must be understood contextually, as it is entangled with 
social inequalities. For instance, there is an abundance of evidence that protection from the virus 
has been limited for some by virtue of race, gender, socio-economic status, employment, and job 
security (Adams-Prassl, 2020; Liao and De Maio, 2021; Saad-Filho, 2020; Schwab and Malleret, 
2020). Exhortations that ‘we are in this together’, or that lay claim to a mutually shared 
experience of loss and sacrifice across social groups, are therefore deeply misleading and belie the 
myriad ways in which the impact of the pandemic and the response to it ‘has laid bare...the vast 
numbers of people in the world who are economically and socially vulnerable’ (Schwab and 
Malleret, 2020: 79). Importantly, sacrificial acts involving the killing of humans documented in 
previous epochs were often inflicted in a manner reflective of hierarchical social relations and 





carried out with the purpose of reinforcing those distinctions (Watts et al, 2016). Indeed, Girard 
(2013: 13) identified a ‘wide spectrum of human victims sacrificed by various societies’ across 
history, including children, prisoners of war, slaves and those with disabilities. Those more 
readily identified as ‘sacrificeable’, he suggested, are usually those ‘exterior or marginal 
individuals’ whose status prevents them from ‘fully integrating themselves into the community’.  
Considering the tentative, yet evident, connections that we have begun to establish, this 
article draws inspiration primarily from the concept of sacrifice and utilises this as a framework 
through which to consider and critically analyse the impact of Covid-19. As Covid-19 has further 
exposed and exacerbated neoliberalism’s inequalities (Saad-Filho, 2020; Schwab and Malleret, 
2020), the article seeks to delineate some of the ways in which sacrifice became a prevalent feature 
of the pandemic. Furthermore, in the spirit of Girard (2013), who asked why the relationship 
between sacrifice and violence has not been explored in more requisite depth, the article situates 
the analysis offered within social scientific debates concerned with violence. In particular, the 
paper seeks to position sacrifice not as an exclusively rare and exceptional act of force that 
breaches states of non-violence, but rather an ‘integral feature of social life’ (Jackman, 2002: 389) 
during the pandemic and inherent to the new ‘normal’ state of things.  
The article is structured into four substantive sections. The first section provides a brief 
overview of the pandemic with a particular focus on the harms that have emanated from it, as 
well as the various moral dilemmas that have emerged concerning appropriate mitigation of these 
respective harms. We suggest that sacrifice has become a means through which such moral 
dilemmas may be to some extent deemed resolved. However, we suggest that in the attempt to 
reinforce the social fabric, these sacrifices leave legacies liable to produce further harm, which we 
address in the final section of the article (Halbertal, 2012). In an attempt to conceptualise 
sacrifice more clearly in relation to the pandemic, we next consider theoretical work on violence, 
providing the basis for a budding framework that envelops the following penultimate section. 
This penultimate section offers a tentative and brief discussion, through different examples, of 
how sacrifice is both simultaneously evident during the pandemic and relevant as a framework 
for interpreting its impact and management. Furthermore, we discuss here how sacrifice has 
historically served to reinforce social bonds and expectations of loyalty from those who the 
sacrifice protects, but question whether this is possible under neoliberalism’s post-social 
arrangements of emotivism, competitive individualism, and self-enhancement. The article closes 
with a discussion and brief conclusion that addresses the key issues raised and suggests how the 
tentative associations developed in the article may be taken forward in further research.  
Covid-19 and an emerging moral quandary on its various harms 
The Coronavirus pandemic represents the most significant and disruptive global event so far of 
the 21st Century (Briggs, et al, 2021). In the relatively short period of time that has elapsed since 
the first cases of the virus were reported in December 2019, social life has been profoundly 
altered in many states across the world. Initially, in the absence of any known effective treatment 
or vaccine, nations responded with strict social distancing measures to reduce transmission and 





have relied upon these intermittently since. In the UK, restrictions on basic civil liberties, 
unknown since the final days of World War Two in 1945, have been applied at varying levels of 
intensity since the pandemic began.  
 
The physical harms of the virus are evident. At the time of writing, the UK alone has 
recorded more than 6 million confirmed positive cases and in excess of 130,000 Covid-19 related 
deathsi. Globally, according to John Hopkins University, there have been over 200 million 
reported cases of the virus. In addition, there are potential, and thus far relatively unknown, 
consequences for those who contract the virus and suffer what has been termed ‘long Covid’: an 
array of debilitating symptoms that may persist for a considerable time afterwards. Health 
outcomes are likely to be severely affected by the pandemic and not just because of contracting 
the virus. For example, recent research assessing the impact of the first UK lockdown upon 
diagnoses for a variety of cancer types estimates substantial increases in avoidable deaths are to 
be expected in the future because of diagnostic delays (Maringe et al, 2020).  
The social and economic consequences of both the virus and the core governmental 
response are considerable too. The various measures taken to shield populations from the virus 
are unintended generators, or catalysts, of further and future harm. Labour market indicators in 
the UK demonstrate that since the pandemic began the number of individuals classed as 
unemployed has been increasing, with 318,000 more people registered unemployed in 
September 2020 compared with the same period a year earlier (ONS, 2020). While a record 
number of redundancies (314,000) were registered in the period from July – September 2020 
(ONS, 2020). Petterson et al (2020: 3) point to an increase in deaths of despair in the US as a 
result of drugs, alcohol and suicides, which they believe ‘should be seen as the epidemic within 
the pandemic’. Confinement to domestic dwellings during the first lockdown in the UK was 
followed by increased reports of violence between intimates (Condry et al, 2020), a trend that 
available evidence indicates has been mirrored in many other states across the world where 
lockdowns were imposed (Ellis, et al, 2021). 
Placed in this context, it is perhaps not surprising that many peoples’ mental health has 
been detrimentally impacted by the pandemic/lockdowns in the UK, especially those from more 
deprived localities who already experienced anxiety or depression (O’Connor, et al 2020). 
Statistical research indicates that, throughout the first lockdown, around one in seven adults had 
suicidal thoughts, while many more reported feelings of loneliness and entrapment (O’Connor, 
et al 2020). As feelings of social isolation have intensified, many people have increased their food 
consumption to help them cope with social uncertainty and distress. Others, including those 
that have eating disorders, have reported an increased concern with both regulating their food 
intake and their body image throughout the pandemic (Robertson, et al 2021). Other studies 
indicate an intensification of mental ill health in the UK, particularly for those that are 
unemployed or on low incomes (Pierce, et al 2020).  
The direct and in-direct harms arising from social distancing measures to address the 
virus are becoming increasingly evident too. The virus itself has caused without question 





considerable harm to public health, but the measures taken in response have indirectly 
contributed to the generation of an array of harms distributed unevenly across the population 
and that manifest both physically and psychologically (Briggs, et al 2020). It is for this reason that 
lockdowns and related social distancing can be considered paradoxical: initiated with the 
intention to protect and preserve life, yet inherent stimulants of harm and threats to life. It is 
from this paradox that great moral discord has emerged and the presence of sacrifice during the 
pandemic becomes clearer.  
Certainly, demands ‘for’ sacrifices, as well as their moral justification in the name of 
preventing the spread of the virus, have been prevalent throughout the pandemic. On the 10th 
May 2020 at a national address, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson thanked the public for 
their ‘effort and sacrifice in stopping the spread of this disease’. In October 2020, at a World 
Health Organisation (WHO) press conference in Geneva, Dr Mike Ryan spoke of the possible 
need for “many, many people” to make sacrifices in their personal lives (Lovelace, 2020). While 
in November 2020 the President of the United States of America, Joe Biden, delivered a 
Thanksgiving address to the nation to highlight the ‘shared sacrifices’ made by many Americans 
throughout the Covid-19 pandemic (Woodward, 2020). 
Alongside various pleas and demands ‘for’ the sacrifice of personal freedom and liberty, 
as well as the lauding of those sacrificing themselves for the ‘greater good’, such as frontline 
workers (see Lohmeyer and Taylor, 2020), utilitarian questions concerning who, what, and how 
much, should be sacrificed, and relatedly whether these sacrifices could be justified, began to 
emerge. In a letter published in the British Medical Journal, a Consultant Medical Microbiologist 
at St George’s Hospital London questioned the moral basis of forcing young people in the UK 
to sacrifice their freedoms ‘so that the older generation can live a bit longer’ (Breathnach, 2020). 
Such sentiments were echoed by Texas lieutenant governor, Dan Patrick, who, in appealing for 
the application of utilitarian principles, pleaded with the US senate not to ‘sacrifice the country’ 
in order to protect older, more vulnerable citizens from the virus who will, he claimed, ‘take care 
of themselves’ (Beckett, 2020). In an interview with Channel 4 News, outspoken critic of 
lockdowns in Britain and member of the Conservative Party, Sir Charles Walker, raised concerns 
about the sustainability of ongoing restrictions and argued that the country could not continue 
to ‘cancel’, or in essence sacrifice, ‘life’ to preserve every life.     
While states have demanded considerable sacrifices from their citizens, there have been 
demands made of states to offer protection from the virus as well as the unintended harms arising 
from the measures implemented to address it. Along with some vocal politicians, protest and 
lobby groups like the Save Our Rights UK movement and the Great Barrington Declaration, 
comprised of scientists and medical professionals from across the world, have formed a consensus 
that responses to the virus unintendedly represent greater social evil because of the harm they 
cause in both the immediate and the longer term. As we will see, as the pandemic has evolved, 
societies have become increasingly confronted with ethical and moral quandaries concerning the 
need for the preservation of both life and the quality of life.  





In the pandemic response, moral arguments take clear sides: a utilitarian response that 
essentially accepts the sacrifice of some to protect the many clashes with a deontological response 
that argues moral judgements about who to sacrifice cannot be universalised and are therefore 
ethically unsound. The fundamental incommensurability of these starting positions is 
irresolvable despite both essentially advocating the protection of life. A third position, a 
teleological virtue ethics, situates goods external to subjective emotion but internal to social roles 
and practice (MacIntyre, 2016; Raymen, 2019). This calls for an understanding of what a ‘good 
life’ means and how we individually and collectively strive towards its realisation. The pandemic 
response, in this context, raises questions about individual and collective flourishing yet, 
increasingly, Western societies are unable to resolve moral quandaries as thorny ethical questions 
that require collective agreement are met with emotivism (MacIntyre, 2011; 2016; Raymen, 
2019). That is, the locus of morality now sits within the individual and the concept of ‘good’ 
reflects how something makes us feel; this rejects the existence of a fundamental telos or external 
adjudicating authority (MacIntyre, 2011). Both sides talk past each other in an interminable 
debate that cannot be resolved. Questions about the quality of life are secondary to the 
administration of non-death, mere preservation, or endurance of life. 
This descent into emotivism represents both the absent telos at the heart of Western 
society (MacIntyre, 2011) and post-political biopolitics par excellence (Žižek, 2008). MacIntryre 
(2011) situates this historic shift within the context of declining virtue ethics and the eradication 
of a telos, in which there is neither collective agreement nor fundamental discussion about the 
constitution of a ‘good life’. Human purpose is largely absent from the kinds of utilitarian and 
deontological positions outlined above, but their absence is reflective of contemporary politics. 
While MacIntryre (2016) notes that politics and ethics are inherently intertwined, contemporary 
politics abandons key ethical questions. The hegemonic power of liberal ideology and its current 
neoliberal variant have reduced politics to the administration of bare life (Agamben, 1995; Žižek, 
2008). Politics is now the mechanism by which we keep people alive, a platform upon which 
each individual can then pursue their own freedoms and self-interest. This is more accurately a 
post-political position as it accepts the horizons of liberalism, reduces politics to the cold 
administrative functions necessary to maintain life and little more. The efficient functioning of 
neoliberal parliamentary politics and the technical administration of everyday life came to 
dominate the political horizon. Experts were required to administer this technocracy in a ‘value 
free’ manner (Hochuli et al, 2021). Liberal post-politics abandons the telos in favour of freedom 
in a negative sense; it provides the negative liberty of freedom from without any ethical, moral or 
political understanding of the freedom to pursue an external good or end (Raymen, 2019). This 
represents the political and ethical vacuum into which the pandemic struck; the public were 
asked to ‘follow the science’ and put faith in our technocratic, administration of bare life without 
any public discussion about the values or principles that underpinned decisions. The pandemic’s 
administration of non-death and mere preservation of life, regardless of the consequences, 
reflects the absent telos at the heart of liberal democracy and is indicative of our current political 
juncture. It is within this moral vacuum that numerous sacrifices were required that remain 
ethically irresolvable. 





This became particularly pronounced as underfunded and under resourced health 
services like the NHS and care homes struggled to cope with the weight of additional demand 
for their services. Faced with being overburdened with patients, many care homes in 2020 
utilised ‘do not resuscitate’ (DNR) orders on some of their residents (Booth, 2000), the majority 
of whom are aged over 70 and often have various health issues like dementia and frailty.  Whilst 
DNRs were utilised to perhaps try and preserve the lives of those younger individuals that 
possessed a better chance of survival and to free up some capacity within the health service, an 
inquiry in the UK is currently underway into their usage (Booth, 2020), since many were 
potentially administered without obtaining the consent of the bereaved family. This has been 
criticised by some commentators, claiming that healthcare workers should not be compelled to 
make judgements on the quality of life, not least because it could potentially lead to 
discrimination and undermine the sanctity of human life (Bledsoe, et al 2020). 
Other moral and ethical dilemmas include how the lockdown forced schools to close, 
impacting detrimentally on children’s’ education and thereby exacerbating educational 
inequalities. Children from socially and economically marginalised communities spent at least 
1.5 hours per day less doing schoolwork than children from more affluent backgrounds, with 
the latter receiving more support and guidance from their parents (Andrew, et al 2020). Whilst 
the former often struggled to access a computer or device connected to the internet at their 
home, they also received fewer online classes from teachers, impacting upon their ability to do 
schoolwork. Given those children from more deprived areas were already often struggling to 
meet the educational attainment requirements, it is likely that lockdowns intensified educational 
inequalities between poorer and more affluent school children (Andrew, et al 2020), indicating 
that some working-class children’s education was temporarily sacrificed during the pandemic.  
The sacrifices made in the name of averting the greater harm of allowing the virus to 
circulate unimpeded are in themselves evidently damaging and potentially generative of further 
harms. Importantly, Halbertal (2012: 48) suggests that sacrifices ‘for’ others can constitute 
socially binding constraints upon those in the future that serve as bonds between those who are 
sacrificed and those who are saved. In particular, Halbertal suggests: 
‘...Future generations are assumed to be burdened with the onus of that early sacrifice, 
which demands loyalty, since betraying it means retroactively stripping the sacrifice of 
meaning.’   
The longer-term ramifications of exacting great sacrifice in the name of responding to the virus 
are as yet unknown, but certainly contingent upon the extent to which they are acknowledged 
and honoured as societies shift into a post-pandemic period. We consider this issue in more 
depth subsequently, but at this juncture provide an overview of scholarship on violence, to lay 
the groundwork for a discussion of neoliberalism’s systemic violence and its relation to sacrifice 
during the pandemic.  
Approaches to Violence  





As we have begun to outline in the previous sections of this article, sacrifice is a 
particularly significant feature of the Covid-19 landscape especially in light of the panic, discord, 
and deep moral quandaries it has generated concerning protection from the virus and the wider 
human consequences of responding. Therefore, it offers a potentially useful conceptual lens 
through which to explain the social effects of the pandemic. Given the harm that is inherent to 
the making or infliction of a sacrifice and its relationship to violence (Girard, 2013; Halbertal, 
2012), this section of the article offers, by way of a brief but necessary detour, a discussion of 
theoretical approaches to violence to provide a tentative framework within which to consider 
more carefully the meaning and significance of sacrifice during the pandemic.  
Social scientific disciplines, like sociology and criminology, have often assumed a widely 
held view, readily found beyond the confines of the academy, that violence involves physical 
harm, is inflicted wilfully by motivated individuals, and arises from a breakdown or a 
malfunction within institutions that perform an integrative and control function. Such an 
approach effectively situates the phenomenon of violence as ‘without’; an external threat that 
must be addressed, minimised, and contained. Violence is therefore often presumed to be an 
alien and threatening presence that is comprised of ‘eruptions of hostility that have bubbled over 
the normal boundaries of social intercourse’ (Jackman, 2002: 308). A partial result of conceiving 
of violence in this way for Larry Ray (2011: 2) is that ‘sociology seems to have assumed the 
existence of a pacified society in which violence appears in specific places and events’. 
Those ‘specific places and events’ are neatly delineated spatialised territories or seemingly 
isolated incidents to which scholarly attention has often been directed: the less salubrious 
neighbourhoods of cities occupied by dangerous gangs of marginalised young men (Andell, 
2019); violent domestic dwellings (Westmarland, 2015); or violent conflicts that erupt in the 
territories of failed or failing states (Ray, 2011). There exists, then, a discrete range of sub-fields 
within sociology, criminology, and the social sciences more generally that focus upon forms of 
violence or settings in which violence takes place and the individuals present in those spaces 
(Ellis, 2016). The issue of violence is of course multi-faceted in its manifestations and addressing 
specific forms of violence in this way has led to important contributions to the extant literature. 
Reflecting on this tendency within academic disciplines, Ray (2011: 2) has described research 
addressing violence contemporarily as ‘fragmentary’ in nature. An issue with this, Ray suggests, 
is that such fragmentation potentially ‘risks losing sight of the intimate connection between 
violence and the human condition’. Similar sentiments have been echoed by Winlow (2012) 
who, in consideration of criminology’s attempts to theorise human violence, suggests there is a 
tendency amongst criminologists to view violence as tangential to another issue rather than 
violence becoming the focal point of theoretical endeavours. 
Violence, as intimated already, is also often regarded as the antithesis of ‘civilisation’; a 
view reflected in some notable academic contributions. Steven Pinker (2012) has recently 
contrasted what he considers are the less violent societies of modernity, with more frequently 
violent societies that existed historically. Crucial to Pinker’s claims about this decline of violence 
are insights from the work of Norbert Elias (2000) and the ‘civilising process’, which suggested 





successful state monopolies of violence and the development of an attendant capacity for self-
control have, over time, resulted in considerable reductions. There are various and important 
critical accounts of this relationship, particularly of those that suggest a declining presence of 
violence as modernity has progressed. Fromm (1973) posited an opposing relationship, arguing 
that a greater degree of human violence and destruction is evident with the development of 
civilisation and hierarchical social relations. In a similar and equally critical vein, Wieviorka 
(2009: 2) alludes to the problem of assuming that as the capacity for human ‘reason’ proceeds 
the resort to violence recedes. Wieviorka suggests violence may be encouraged by reason and 
continues to possess functional potential for various groups, including states, as a ‘resource or a 
means to an end’. Criminologist Steve Hall (2012; 2014) points to the fragile and precarious 
process that underlies declines in violence in certain territories, describing this as the result of 
an economically functional and paradoxical process of ‘pseudo-pacification’. The temptation to 
assume then that ‘advanced societies are no longer seriously troubled by violence and that 
theories of violence are perforce losing their raison d’etre’ (Keane, 1996: 9) should be resisted. 
Although the failure to resist such an assertion may perhaps be the product of how 
violence is conceptualised or regarded. Importantly, the arguably limited scope within which 
violence has sometimes been viewed and understood can result in conceptual obscurity. Through 
reviewing attempts made to define violence, Jackman (2002: 388) has argued that scholars 
‘commonly refer to a phenomenon called violence that implies a clearly understood, generic class 
of behaviours’ and yet, Jackman suggests, ‘no such concept exists’. While labouring under this 
misconception, a decidedly narrow set of assumptions about violence in human social life have 
emerged. Importantly, Jackman argues for the benefits of expanding the dominant view of 
violence to enable recognition of the fact that ‘violent actions are a normal part of the human 
repertoire’ rather than always necessarily ‘deviant’ from it, and that violence ‘incorporates a 
diverse array of actions that are an integral feature of social life’ (p.389).  
Jackman’s insights take us some distance from those approaches to violence concerned 
with identifiable physical harm carried out by motivated individuals and groups, and which, as 
a result, becomes routinely positioned as deviant and in contrast to order and civility. On the 
contrary, violence and harm frequently result from forms of inaction and through attempts to 
maintain political systems, which may not require the direct application of force and may be 
sacrificial in nature. Ruggiero (2020), for example, describes ‘strategies of omission’ where 
addressing conditions of suffering or injustice are designated an economic impossibility by 
political authorities. Relatedly, there are the frequent failures of powerful state actors to address 
conditions of danger, despite possessing knowledge that if left unaddressed these will likely cause 
injury or death (Cooper and Whyte, 2018; Pemberton, 2016). These are representative of mere 
parts of the much greater ‘hidden complexities of violence in contemporary societies’ (Lohmeyer 
and Taylor, 2020: 2). However, such complexity is often not acknowledged due to what Evans 
and Giroux (2015: 3) describe as neoliberalism’s ‘most monstrous of illusions’, through which 
its own capacity for destruction is concealed and scripted in ways that suggest violence is 
becoming less of a problem. What is of further importance from Jackman’s (2002) discussion 





mentioned previously, particularly for the analysis offered in this article, is the violence that arises 
from seemingly positive intentions, or that is an incidental by-product of other actions; even 
those that may be undertaken in the service of life or to avert other harm. What may be termed 
‘good’ violence (Dupuy, 2013). This often remains elusive and unacknowledged, resulting in 
frequent neglect of the myriad ways in which many are harmed ‘unintentionally’ and sometimes 
because of what may also be well-meaning state interventions (Mason, 2020); indeed, the road to 
hell may be paved with good intentions. 
This brief, but necessary, detour along the broad contours of the social scientific 
investigation of violence leads us towards a means of conceiving of violence as potentially 
unintended and yet inherent in the maintenance of contemporary political and economic 
systems, especially in the face of threats to their continuation. This is vital to capture more fully 
the complexity of violence that has often remained unacknowledged. Importantly, as Lohmeyer 
and Taylor (2020) have argued recently, the pandemic itself provides a moment in which the 
complexity of contemporary violence, particularly what they identify as the structural and cultural 
violence of neoliberalism, may be viewed more clearly. Furthermore, we are pushed towards a 
recognition of what might be termed or considered ‘good’ violence that emanates from well-
meaning intentions or the very attempts to avert other perceived, possibly greater, violence and 
harm; something that appears to be in evidence during the pandemic and manifest in the 
demand for various sacrifices as briefly discussed already. Following the important insights 
afforded by this consideration of violence, the following section seeks to develop a clearer 
theoretical exposition on the relationship between sacrifice and the Covid-19 pandemic.  
Sacrifice and Covid-19 
In the previous sections of this article, we have begun to assemble the foundations of a 
potential relationship between sacrifice and the Covid-19 pandemic, particularly the various 
moral quandaries that responding to it has presented to societies. A brief but demonstrable case 
has been made for these evident connections and in this penultimate part of the paper we seek 
to flesh this out in more detail in order to assemble upon those foundations a tentative set of 
assertions that speak to the utility of sacrifice as a conceptual lens through which to view the 
pandemic. 
The previous section’s brief consideration of various attempts to conceptualise violence 
revealed both evident complexities and paradoxes. Girard’s (2013) work on violence and the 
sacred is particularly instructive in this respect for addressing somewhat the evident paradoxes 
that emerge from the study of human violence. For Girard, put straightforwardly, there is 
violence in society’s attempts to prevent violence. As Buffachi (2005: 193) cogently observed: ‘if 
violence is the problem, violence is also the solution’. In explicating the nature of this irony 
further, Girard (2013) focuses upon the sacrificial act that inflicts suffering. In doing so, Girard 
suggests that through sacrifices: 





‘...society is seeking to deflect upon a relatively indifferent victim, a “sacrificeable’ 
victim, the violence that would otherwise be vented on its own members, the people 
it most desires to protect’ (2013: 4).  
For Girard (2013), sacrifice serves to avert more destructive harm and reinforces social bonds, 
yet, simultaneously, this is often reflective of social hierarchies particularly with regards to who 
becomes designated as the victims and that are deemed ‘sacrificeable’. The violence that takes 
place during the sacrificial act may become regarded then, as Dupuy (2013: 15) has suggested, as 
‘a “good” form of institutionalised violence that holds in check “bad” anarchic violence’ that 
threatens stability. There is of course great irony here that Dupuy is acutely aware of. Dupuy goes 
on to suggest that as a result, evil works to contain evil, citing by way of example the proliferation 
of nuclear armament during the Cold War which, ironically, it is suggested contributed to the 
prevention of an outbreak of violence on a larger scale amidst escalating tensions within and 
between states. As a form of ‘good violence’ or ‘necessary evil’ then, sacrifice inflicted upon 
specific victims becomes particularly crucial during times of societal crisis. Indeed, as Ray (2011: 
195) has argued, there is evidence for the fundamental process outlined by Girard ‘at the level 
of ...whole societies’ and ‘especially...at points of crisis’.  
The crises engendered by historic epidemics of infectious diseases have previously led to 
the initiation of the kinds of sacrificial mechanisms that Girard outlined, particularly the 
systematic targeting of groups with ‘outsider’ status who became the focal point of wider society’s 
panic and discord. In Medieval Europe, for example, Jews were routinely identified as spreaders 
of diseases or were seen as responsible for transmission, and subject to violence and persecution 
(Schwab and Malleret, 2020). During the Covid-19 pandemic, similar incidents of wilful hostility 
and violent racism have been directed towards individuals of Asian origin, targeted in the belief 
that they are responsible for the origins of the virus as the first known cases were reported in 
China (Cabral, 2021; Gover et al, 2020).  
Other sacrificial mechanisms during the pandemic have been subtler and structurally 
embedded, but nevertheless predicated on the same mechanisms and generally targeted at groups 
united by their lower socio-economic and minority status. Consistent then with a systemic 
violence that produces what Žižek (2008) terms the ‘zero level’ against which subjective, agent-
led violence is rendered visible, ‘good’ violence or ‘necessary evil’, are more effectively concealed 
through their embeddedness within sacred and, more so contemporarily, profane institutions 
(Dupuy, 2013; 2014). Dupuy (2014: 11) importantly reminds us of this fundamental 
contemporary paradox in his critical discussion of neoliberal political economy and the functions 
it performs following the de-sacralisation of many particularly Western nations:  
‘Economy has violence in it; it is, if you like, inherently violent. But it also acts as a 
barrier against violence. It is as if violence finds in commerce and industry the means 
of limiting itself, and therefore protecting the social order against collapse’. 
On this basis, Dupuy asks whether the economy should be considered remedy or poison 
and seems to conclude that it is both. Its remedial qualities lie in its ability to contain and limit 





internecine violence that would otherwise result in self-annihilation. Steve Hall (2014) contends, 
along similar lines, that capitalist political economy puts to service potentially and otherwise 
destructive libidinal drives, harnessing them to serve processes of accumulation and growth 
through non-violent interpersonal competition. The paradox exists though in economy’s Janus-
face, specifically the poison it simultaneously distils through exploitation, subjugation and 
structural violence inflicted upon sections of the human population (see Cooper and Whyte, 
2018; Galtung, 1969; Lohmeyer and Taylor, 2020).  
While Dupuy points towards the troubling realisation of the function of necessary evil 
within systemic and institutional structures that inflict an unavoidable, yet limited, amount of 
damage on sections of human populations to hold at bay more destructive forces, Ruggiero 
(2020: 28) highlights the way that power through such structures ‘inflicts a form of sacrificial 
violence...whereby vulnerable victims suffer...so that those protected by power can thrive’. 
Indeed, Schwab and Malleret (2020) describe the dichotomy that emerged during the pandemic 
between social classes and that mirrors this violent sacrificial process. As the pandemic unfolded, 
the ability of different social groups to erect barriers against it and the moral quandaries and 
harms it has generated became increasingly evident: ‘the uber-rich moved into their yachts, the 
merely rich fled to their second homes, the middle class struggled to work from home’ (Saad-
Filho, 2020: 480). Crucially, wealth softened the blow of social distancing and the restrictions 
placed upon movement and daily life. Members of the working class, however, were more likely 
to be employed in occupations that placed them on ‘the front line to help save lives and the 
economy – cleaning hospitals, manning the checkouts, transporting essentials and ensuring our 
security’ (Schwab and Malleret, 2020: 80).  
In their analysis of media coverage during the first wave of the pandemic in both the UK 
and Australia, Lohmeyer and Taylor (2020) note the frequent invoking of heroism and the 
military in reference to the efforts made in response to the virus, particularly those individuals 
employed in roles where adjustments to working practices to minimise transmission were not 
possible. Even the use of and emphasis placed upon the term ‘frontline’ when describing the 
roles associated with and performed by these workers, denotes militaristic connotations of 
infantry engaged in direct close proximal combat with opposition forces. 
In the UK, the frontline of the pandemic has undoubtedly been the NHS. In practice, a 
health care system is designed to protect citizens (Jones and Hameiri, 2021) but from the outset 
of the pandemic, the NHS became a sacred institution that required collective sacrifice to protect 
it. “Protect the NHS” became the mantra as lockdown and social distancing measures were the 
collective price required to preserve the sacred (Briggs, et al 2020). This required a determination 
concerning which parts of the economy were essential and which could be sacrificed. 
Paradoxically, the workers within the NHS became buffers against the virus and were sacrificed 
to protect the rest of society. The phrase ‘key workers’ entered popular consciousness to denote 
those essential workers employed on the frontline to keep our society functioning (Briggs et al, 
2020). NHS staff, care home workers, cleaners, retail workers, delivery drivers and other 
emergency services became sacrificial offerings to protect the rest of society from greater harm. 





The violence inherent within this offering – their potential exposure to a deadly virus – sacralised 
frontline key workers and in the first weeks of the pandemic generated ritual praise through the 
weekly ‘clap for carers’ doorstep applause, a symbolic gesture of recognition for the sacrifice made 
on our behalf (Wood and Skeggs, 2020). 
The ultimate sacrifice is to give one’s life in the service of a greater or collective good 
(Halbertal, 2012) and media reports throughout the pandemic have focused on the deaths of 
NHS workers and care home staff (Lintern, 2020), with the Office for National Statistics 
reporting that, between March and December 2020, almost 900 health and social care workers 
had died with Covid-19 in the UK (ONS, 2021). These workers were, in Dupuy’s (2013:117) 
terms, ‘scapegoats’ in the true sense of the term when ‘society causes its wrongs to fall upon an 
innocent individual or group’ – the failure to adequately prepare and ensure sufficient 
protections against a viral pandemic. Widespread appreciation and acknowledgement, like 
children’s drawings of rainbows in windows, weekly doorstep clapping, exclusive discounts and 
offers on consumer goods, arguably acted as an attempt at the expiation of society’s collective 
guilt for the absence of fundamental preparations and protections.  
However, the absence of adequate preparation and protection is symptomatic of the 
contemporary capitalist system. Capitalism’s systemic violence imposes upon the sacrifice of key 
workers in a way that reveals the disavowed ‘real’ (Hall, 2012) – the exploitation and 
preparedness to harm others essential to the system’s continuation but that remains disavowed 
and subject to frequent denial. The absence of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) at the outset 
of the pandemic exposed frontline workers to harm and demonstrated the limits of both 
neoliberal governance structures and globalised just-in-time supply chains (Jones and Hameiri, 
2021). The mad scramble for PPE revealed a system that privileged market forces, competition, 
outsourced supply chains and networks, global trade routes and a hollowed-out state where 
government had been replaced with governance (Jones and Hameiri, 2021). Despite warnings 
about the likely impact of a global pandemic, governments were underprepared and would rue 
their reliance on highly insecure just-in-time production and delivery models that reflected a 
neoliberal approach to governance and that suited corporate interests. The normal functioning 
of the capitalist economy left frontline healthcare workers at risk of harm in the early days of a 
pandemic where the virus had no known treatment and could be passed easily without the 
protection afforded by PPE. While frontline workers displayed the hallmarks of Halbertal’s 
(2012) and Keenan’s (2005) self-sacrifice in the service of a higher cause, the systemic violence of 
capitalism also sacrificed low-paid, overworked, and precarious workers (Ruggerio, 2020). 
Capitalism’s sacrificial offering came at a price: a proposed 1% pay rise for frontline nurses who, 
over 12 months into the pandemic, were now displaying signs of PTSD, stress, anxiety, and 
depression (Green et al, 2021). Public outrage and the official rejection of the 1% pay increase 
reflects a social desire for their sacrifice to be recognised and validated in a more meaningful way; 
yet the systemic violence of capitalism insists upon the continuation of precarity, low-pay and 
insecure work (Lloyd, 2018), resulting in a tokenistic gesture rather than a fundamental 
betterment in their material conditions. 





Importantly, Girard (2013) and Halbertal (2012) suggest that sacrifice always takes place 
within a hierarchical structure. This is true of the Covid-19 pandemic as the greatest sacrifice 
appears to have been borne by the frontline workers, while many others worked from home or 
received furlough payments. However, a range of sacrifices are visible across the pandemic and 
potentially exist on several levels in what might be identified as a sacrificial hierarchy depicted 
visually in Fig 1. 
Fig 1: Conceptualising the relationship between the ‘sacred’ and ‘sacrificed’ 
 
 
As indicated in Fig 1, whilst the NHS and its supporting healthcare institutions were cast as the 
sacred, frontline workers might be branded as the sacred sacrificers since they worked to protect 
what the government regarded as sacred, something which all individuals should strive to protect 
and uphold even at the expense of their own physical and mental wellbeing. Moreover, care 
home residents, the elderly and the vulnerable, could be deemed the primary sacrificers; as 
mentioned, this is clear particularly during the initial stages of the pandemic whereby the 
systemic violence of neoliberalism and its recent economic logic of austerity meant many 
healthcare services were privatised and underfunded (Baines and Cunningham, 2015), and often 
unable to adequately mitigate the risks of Covid-19. Lastly, at the bottom of the sacrificial 
hierarchy lie the secondary sacrificers which includes the various sacrificial losses of members of 
wider society, not least peoples’ mental health, cultural freedoms and other illnesses and health 
appointments that were transiently sacrificed to focus on the threats and harms posed by Covid-
19. 
Discussion 
Returning to the violence of economy, we can situate the sacrifice outlined previously within the 
systemic violence of neoliberal capitalism (Žižek, 2008). As noted already, violence is a 
normalised element of both human nature and capitalist political economy and throughout each 
successive ‘spirit of capitalism’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005), a variety of groups have been 





sacrificed in order for others to flourish. This process has historically reflected existing 
inequalities and hierarchies within the system; from 19th century industrial workers in the UK 
and USA to 21st century miners and sweatshop labour in the Far East, from migrant workers to 
modern slaves. The unequal sacrifice of the poor, working-class, minorities, marginalised and, 
ultimately, disposable workers, is a persistent feature of the perpetuation of a violent system. The 
result of the Covid-19 pandemic’s interaction with capitalist political economy bears these 
historic features. To keep society functioning and some semblance of economic activity in place, 
the lowest paid, most insecure, precarious, and exploited forms of labour were sacrificed to 
protect the rest and maintain some productivity.  
Dupuy’s (2014) contention that the ‘good’ violence inherent within the economy is 
deployed to remedy more serious forms of ‘bad’ violence is well-judged in relation to the 
pandemic. Harm and violence have been visited upon certain sections of the population such as 
those that are vulnerable through their employment to prevent greater harms throughout the 
social order. Many have survived and even flourished throughout the pandemic, and we can 
situate this within the context of sacrificial violence inflicted upon others. Violence as the answer 
to violence appears in other examples too. Domestic violence calls to the charity Refuge rose by 
25% in the first month of the UK’s first lockdown (Nicola, 2020). Paradoxically, the violence 
inherent within the normal functioning of labour markets acted as ‘good’ violence that was only 
visible by its absence. The release valves of work, socialising, and leisure disappeared with ‘stay at 
home’ orders, unemployment, furlough, and online working; families were forced into close 
proximity for prolonged periods without respite and domestic violence spiralled (Ellis, et al 
2021). In some senses, the ‘good’ violence routinely meted out by the economic system averted 
to some extent a wave of ‘bad’ violence in domestic spheres. In the sense of sacrificial violence, 
those victims of domestic and child abuse were sacrificed for the greater good. 
In conceiving of this violence in terms of harm, we see the unintentional consequences of 
the normal functioning of a system built on violence, but also what ultra-realist criminologists 
have identified as the positive motivation to harm (Hall and Winlow, 2015; Lloyd, 2018; Telford 
& Lloyd, 2020). Inequality emerges from a willingness to inflict harm on others (Lloyd, 2018). 
On a subjective level, individuals emboldened by ‘special liberty’ pursue their expressive and 
instrumental ends unencumbered by adherence to law and societal norms (Hall, 2012; Tudor, 
2018). If we shift our focus to the macro-level, Dupuy (2014) suggests that sacrifice is embedded 
within the economy. As we have stated, violence and sacrifice are intimately connected and 
therefore we could argue that a measure of sacrifice is always required to avert a greater anarchy. 
The sacrificial process of the more disposable members of human populations represents: 
‘the purest and most extreme embodiment of the abusive, negligent and exploitative 
relationships between the capitalist socio-economic system and the individual’ (Hall 
and Wilson, 2014: 650) 
This represents a willingness to inflict harm and violence upon disposable populations. Sacrifice, 
as in the case of the Covid-19 pandemic, is an essential and integral feature of a society and 
economic system that must forestall consequences potentially more harmful than the violence it 





enacts. In returning to Girard’s (2013) analysis, we were never ‘all in it together’; those sacrificed 
on the front line of the pandemic deflected violence from those that the power structures and 
ideology of neoliberal capitalism most sought to protect. The prevailing ideology of a post-
political neoliberalism has emphasised individual competition, status, display, emotivism and 
accumulation for decades (Winlow and Hall, 2013); therefore, many of those sacrificed on the 
frontline have been those that are marginalised, socio-economically precarious and disposable, 
or what we might brand as the losers upon the field of neoliberal capitalism. 
Girard (2013) suggests that those sacrificed throughout history have usually been an 
‘other’, an outsider on the margins of the social fabric. Perhaps the most extreme form of 
‘Othering’ occurred under Nazi Germany and manifested in the Holocaust, whereby Jews were 
cast as the cause of society’s problems and were murdered in their millions (Whitehead, 2018). 
However, those that are cast as ‘others’ under neoliberalism have principally been socially and 
economically marginalised groups, particularly problematic drug users, the unemployed, 
prisoners, as well as immigrants and asylum seekers (Whitehead, 2018). Those that have been 
sacrificed during the Covid-19 pandemic, though, particularly frontline workers, are therefore 
not a traditional ‘other’, though they were sacrificed to protect society and those further up the 
social structure like neoliberalism’s socio-economic winners, many of whom witnessed their 
wealth increase during the pandemic (Briggs, et al 2021). 
Despite playing a central and important role in society both before and throughout the 
pandemic, many of the pandemic’s sacrificial others like care workers continue to endure 
degrading working conditions including low-pay, non-unionization, zero-hour contracts and long 
working hours (Briggs, et al 2021). This is because the systemic violence of neoliberal capitalism 
insists upon the importance of the maximisation of profitability, market expansion and capital 
accumulation, severing the historic Hegelian master-slave relation (Hall, 2012; Telford & Lloyd, 
2020). While capital historically required the recognition of employees to secure its hegemony, 
it no longer needed the acknowledgement of workers under neoliberalism, since the emergence 
of a reserve army of labour meant they could be easily disposed of when they were no longer 
required. Whilst many of those sacrificed were not history’s traditional ‘others’, they were often 
in socio-economically precarious positions and thus deemed more disposable than other social 
groups. 
However, the Covid-19 pandemic revealed that society does require the nurses, care 
home workers and couriers, among others, to keep society and the economy functioning. As 
mentioned, they were rebranded as frontline workers, often denied access to PPE and did not 
have the option to work within the safe and comfortable surroundings of their home. If a partial 
meaning of sacrifice is loyalty to a higher and more noble cause (Girard, 2013; Halbertal, 2012), 
then key workers - many of whom often laboured in difficult conditions to protect the most 
vulnerable elderly people in care homes; provided care to those that suffered with ill health in 
hospitals; and often travelled many miles per day and thus came into contact with countless 
people and thereby increased their risk of contracting Covid-19 to deliver important items – 
evidently exemplify this commitment to a virtuous ideal. Therefore, it might be argued that ‘it is 





the mark of the good that it deserves sacrifice’ (Halbertal, 2012: 68), not least because sacrifice 
has historically been a means to reinforce the fabric and bonds of the social order (Girard, 2013).  
However, how well does the sacrificial offerings documented above reinforce the fabric 
of neoliberalism’s social order; or, indeed, is there a cogent social order to be reinforced? 
Throughout the neoliberal era, individualism and the profit motive have seeped further into 
society and reached areas of life previously untouched, restructuring social institutions and 
relations along the cold lines of the business logic (Whitehead, 2018). Perhaps we witnessed a 
transient burst of communal spirit during the initial stages of the pandemic, with some relatives 
often dropping food off for their elderly family members who were self-isolating, as well as our 
shared sacrifices which meant ‘me first’ individualism was somewhat subordinated to the 
collective. Over time, though, it became clear that this sense of social cohesiveness and 
community was temporary, with many people longing for the return of individual freedoms and 
gratification, while clear divisions and tensions have emerged around one’s level of commitment 
to the imposed restrictions (Briggs, et al 2021). As fatalism, resignation and scepticism have 
become doxic, many peoples’ belief in the possibility of a better world has collapsed (Winlow & 
Hall, 2013). The solipsistic and hollow pleasures of consumer culture are embraced to mitigate 
a structural sense that something has gone wrong, or is missing (Lloyd, 2018). Absent is a 
universal and convincing political narrative to explain peoples’ place in the world; the traditional 
tools for identity formation like social class and community have evaporated. 
This is what some have referred to as a post-social world (Raymen, 2019; Telford & Lloyd, 
2020; Winlow & Hall, 2013), whereby commitments to the collective Good are absent and all 
that matters is self-enhancement (Raymen, 2019). The longer the pandemic lasted, this absence 
of a telos, purpose or collective Good made the demands for sacrifice much harder to accept. 
The continued existence of as many people as possible – the administration of non-death – 
became a moral end in itself, while questions about purpose, flourishing and the virtues inherent 
in living a ‘good life’ were ignored. Whilst Halbertal’s (2012) point that sacrifice and recognition 
of it has the potential to move us beyond individual desires, drives and goals towards the Good, 
was clear in the short-term during the pandemic, the sacrifice of those on the frontline and our 
collective sacrifices more generally potentially mean that the systemic violence of neoliberalism 
has merely been maintained in the longer term. 
Conclusion 
This article has highlighted the evident presence of sacrifice throughout the Covid-19 pandemic. 
We have begun to develop here some tentative but evidently important connections between the 
pandemic and the concept of sacrifice, which do require further consideration. We have also 
provided a demonstrable case for the utility of this concept for understanding the impact and 
societal response to the threat the virus poses to the social fabric, which is also in need of greater 
attention particularly as society shifts into a post-pandemic period. 
The arrival of Covid-19 has without doubt required personal sacrifices to be made of 
varying kinds in an attempt to resolve the various moral dilemmas that its management presents 





for human society. The various sacrifices made have frequently been lauded by politicians and 
others as evidence of a collective commitment to a common higher cause by individuals across 
the social strata. A focus purely upon personal sacrifices made by individuals though without 
appreciation of context, obscures the broader social and historical backdrop in which sacrificial 
processes are both undertaken by individuals and also enacted upon them. It also ignores the 
greater complexity of human violence and its centrality within social relations, which many 
authors discussed in this article alert us to. Contemporary sacrifices made in the Covid-19 era 
bare many of the hallmarks of historic sacrificial acts and processes, particularly in terms of their 
hierarchical nature. The sacrifices discussed here, while undertaken and enacted in pursuit of a 
perceived notion of common social good, must also be understood as emblematic of systemic 
violence that works to maintain the functioning of current neoliberal economic and political 
systems by routinely harming sections of human populations that are considered disposable and 
therefore ‘sacrificeable’. While historically, as significant theorists also discussed here have 
suggested, sacrifice served the function of restoring the social fabric in the face of threats and 
crises, the potential for this in the contemporary neoliberal period requires further critical 
consideration. 
There is the potential to recognise Covid-19, and the sacrifices entailed in the response 
to it, as an ‘event’ (Winlow and Hall, 2013) that may transform society and social life for the 
better by awakening populations to the importance of mutual care, support and regard for others, 
over individual desires, and thus hollow consumer pleasures (Briggs et al, 2020). Indeed, the 
myriad sacrifices made during the pandemic bequeath a great burden of responsibility upon 
those who were protected to ensure those sacrifices are honoured (Halbertal, 2012), and act as a 
catalyst for reassessing and possibly altering the various harmful aspects of our socio-economic 
arrangements. With many contemporary critical theorists highlighting the specifically post-social 
character of contemporary relations and the repeated obstruction of an agreed upon notion of 
the ‘good’, the noble sacrifices made in response to the pandemic do risk being rapidly forgotten, 
and therefore undertaken and enacted purely for the protection and furtherance of a 
fundamentally unequal and violent system.  
 
References 
Adams-Prassl, A Boneva, T Golin, M Rauh, C (2020) Inequality in the impact of the coronavirus 
shock: Evidence from real time surveys. Journal of Public Economics. 189. 104245. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104245 
Agamben, G. (1995) Homo Sacer. Stanford: University Press. 
Andell, P. (2019) Thinking Seriously About Gangs. London: Palgrave. 
Andrew, A Cattan, S Dias, M Farquharson, C Kraftman, L et al (2020) Inequalities in Children’s 
Experiences of Home Learning during the COVID-19 Lockdown in England. Fiscal Studies. 
41(3): 653-683. 





Baines, D. and Cunningham, I. (2015) Care work in the context of austerity. Competition & 
Change. 19(3): 183-193. 
Beckett, L (2020) Older people would rather die that let Covid-19 harm US economy – Texas 
official. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/24/older-people-would-
rather-die-than-let-covid-19-lockdown-harm-us-economy-texas-official-dan-patrick  
Bledsoe, T Jokela, J Deep, N Sulmasy, L (2020) Universal Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, Social 
Worth, and Life-Years: Opposing Discriminatory Approaches to the Allocation of Resources 
During the COVID-19 Pandemic and Other Health System Catastrophes. Annals of Internal 
Medicine. 173(3): 230-232. https://doi.org/10.7326/M20-1862  
Boltanski, L. and Chiapello, E. (2005) The New Spirit of Capitalism. London: Verso. 
Booth, R (2020) Inquiry begins into blanket use in England of Covid ‘do not resuscitate’ orders. 
The Guardian. Monday 12th October 2020. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/12/inquiry-begins-into-blanket-use-in-england-
of-covid-do-not-resuscitate-orders  
Breathnach, A (2020) Covid-19 elimination: should we force our young to sacrifice their 
freedoms so the older generation can live a bit longer? BMJ; 371 
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m3880  
Briggs, D., Ellis, A., Lloyd, A. and Telford, L. (2021) Researching the Covid-19 Pandemic: A Critical 
Blueprint for the Social Sciences. Bristol: Policy Press  
Briggs, D Ellis, A Lloyd, A & Telford, L (2020) New hope or old futures in disguise? 
Neoliberalism, the covid-19 pandemic, and the possibility for social change. International Journal 
of Sociology and Social Policy. 40(9/10): 831-848. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSSP-07-2020-0268 
Bufacchi, V (2005) Two concepts of violence. Political Studies Review. 3(2) 193-204. 
https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1478-9299.2005.00023.x  
 
Cabral, S (2021) Covid ‘hate crimes’ against Asian Americans on rise. 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-56218684  
Condry, R Miles, C... (2020) Experiences of Child and Adolescent to Parent Violence in the 
Covid-19 Pandemic. https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/final_report_capv_in_covid-
19_aug20.pdf  
Cooper, V and Whyte, D (2018) Grenfell, Austerity, and Institutional Violence. Sociological 
Research Online. P.1-10 
 
Dupuy, J P (2013) The Mark of the Sacred. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Dupuy, J P (2014) Economy and the Future. Michigan: Michigan State University Press. 
 
Elias, N (2000) The Civilising Process. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 





Ellis, A. (2016) Men, Masculinities and Violence: An Ethnographic Study. London: Routledge. 
Ellis, A Briggs, D Lloyd, A and Telford, L (2021) A ticking time bomb of future harm: Lockdown, 
child abuse and future violence. Abuse: An Impact Journal. 2(1) 37-48. 
https://doi.org/10.37576/abuse.2021.017   
 
Evans, B and Giroux, H (2015) Disposable Futures: The Seduction of Violence in the Age of Spectacle. 
City Lights Books 
 
Fromm, E (1973) The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. London: Pimlico. 
 
Galtung, J (1969) Violence, Peace and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research Vol 6, No. 3, 
p.167-191 
 
Girard, R (2013) Violence and the Sacred. London: Bloomsbury. 
 
Gover, A.R., Harper, S.B. and Langton, L. (2020) Anti-Asian hate crime during the Covid-19 
pandemic: Exploring the reproduction of inequality. American Journal of Criminal Justice. 45, 647-
667. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12103-020-09545-1.pdf  
 
Greene, T. et al. (2021) Predictors and rates of PTSD, depression and anxiety in UK frontline 
health and social care workers during Covid-19. European Journal of Psychotraumatology. 12(1) 
1882781. https://doi.org/10.1080/20008198.2021.1882781  
 
Halbertal, M (2012) On Sacrifice. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Hall, S. (2012) Theorizing Crime and Deviance. London: Sage. 
 
Hall, S (2014) The Socioeconomic Function of Evil. Sociological Review. 62 (S2) 13-31. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-954X.12189     
 
Hall, S. and Wilson, D. (2014) New foundations: Pseudo-pacification and special liberty as 
potential cornerstones for a multi-level theory of homicide and serial murder. European Journal of 
Criminology. 11(5) 635-655. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1477370814536831  
 
Hall, S. and Winlow, S. (2015) Revitalizing Criminological Theory. London: Routledge. 
 
Hochuli, A., Hoare, G. and Cunliffe, P. (2021) The End of the End of History. Winchester: Zero. 
 
Jackman, M (2002) Violence in Social Life. Annual Review of Sociology. 28. 387-415. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.28.110601.140936  
 
Jones, L. and Hameiri, S. (2021) Covid-19 and the failure of the neoliberal regulatory state. 
Review of International Political Economy. Online first. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2021.1892798  
 
Keane, J (1996) Reflections on Violence. London: Verso 






Keenan, D K (2005) The Question of Sacrifice. Indiana: Indiana University Press  
 
Liao, T and De Maio, F (2021) Association of Social and Economic Inequality with Coronavirus 
Disease 2019 Incidence and Mortality Across US Counties. JAMA network open. 4 (1)  
 
Lintern, S. (2020) Coronavirus: Deaths of hundreds of frontline NHS and care workers to be 




Lloyd, A. (2018) The Harms of Work. Bristol: University Press. 
Lohmeyer, B and Taylor, N (2020) War, Heroes and Sacrifice: Masking Neoliberal Violence 
During the Covid-19 Pandemic. Critical Sociology. 47(4/5) 625-639. 
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0896920520975824  
 
Lovelace, B (2020) WHO says getting the worsening Covid outbreak under control may require 
‘sacrifice for many, many people’. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/26/who-says-stemming-
coronavirus-may-rqequire-.html  
 
Maringe, C., Spicer, J., Morris, M., Purushotham, A., Nolte, E., & Sullivan, R. (2020). The 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on cancer deaths due to delays in diagnosis in England, 
UK: a national, population-based, modelling study. The Lancet, 21(8), 1023-34 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1470-2045(20)30388-0 
Mason, W (2020) ‘No One Learned’: Interpreting a Drugs Crackdown Operation and its 
Consequences through the ‘lens’ of Social Harm. British Journal of Criminology. 60, 382-402. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azz047   
MacIntyre, A. (2011) After Virtue. London: Bloomsbury. 
MacIntyre, A. (2016) Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity. Cambridge: University Press. 
Nicola, M. et al. (2020) The socio-economic implications of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-
19): A review. International Journal of Surgery. 78. 185-193. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijsu.2020.04.018  
O’Connor, R Wetherall, K Cleare, S McClelland, H Melson, A et al (2020) Mental health and 
well-being during the COVID-19 pandemic. The British Journal of Psychiatry. 1-18. 
Office for National Statistics (2021) Coronavirus (COVID-19) related deaths by occupation, England 
and Wales. 25th January 2021. Available at 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/causesofdeath
/datasets/coronaviruscovid19relateddeathsbyoccupationenglandandwales  
Pemberton, S (2016) Harmful Societies: Understanding social harm. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Petterson, S Westfall, J & Miller, B (2020) Projected Deaths of Despair from Covid-19. Robert 
Graham Center. 





Pierce, M Hope, H Ford, T Hatch, S Hotopf, M John, A Kontopantelis, E (2020) Mental health 
before and during the COVID-19 pandemic: a longitudinal probability sample survey of the UK 
population. The Lancet Psychiatry. 7(10): 883-892. 
Pinker, S (2012) The Better Angels of Our Nature. New York: Viking. 
Ray, L (2011) Violence and Society. London: Sage. 
Raymen, T. (2019) The Enigma of Social Harm and the Barrier of Liberalism: Why Zemiology 
Needs a Theory of the Good. Justice, Power and Resistance. 3(1) 134-163. 
https://pearl.plymouth.ac.uk/handle/10026.1/12408  
Robertson, M Duffy, F Newman, E Bravo, C Ates, H Sharpe, H (2021) Exploring changes in 
body image, eating and exercise during the COVID-19 lockdown: A UK survey. Appetite. 159: 1-
6. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2020.105062  
Ruggiero, V (2020) Visions of Political Violence. London: Routledge. 
Saad-Filho, A (2020) From COVID-19 to the End of Neoliberalism. Critical Sociology. 46(5) 477-
485. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0896920520929966  
Schwab, K. & Malleret, T. (2020) Covid 19: The Great Reset. Switzerland: World Economic 
Forum. 
Telford, L. & Lloyd, A. (2020) From “infant Hercules” to “ghost town”: Industrial collapse and 
social harm in Teesside. Critical Criminology. 28(4) 595-611. 
Tudor, K. (2018) Toxic sovereignty: Understanding fraud as the expression of special liberty 
within late-capitalism. Journal of Extreme Anthropology. 2(2) 7-21. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5617/jea.6476  
Watts, J Sheehan, O Atkinson, Q Bulbulia, J and Gray, R (2016) Ritual human sacrifice 
promoted and sustained the evolution of stratified societies. Nature. Vol 532, 7598. 228 234. 
Westmarland, N. (2015) Violence against Women: Criminological perspectives on men’s violences. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Whitehead P (2018) Demonising the other: The Criminalisation of Morality. University of Bristol: 
Policy Press. 
Wieviorka, M (2009) Violence: a new approach. London: Sage  
Winlow, S (2012) ‘All that is sacred is profaned’: Towards a theory of subjective violence. In 
Hall, S and Winlow, S (eds) New Directions in Criminological Theory. London: Routledge. 
Winlow, S. and Hall, S. (2013) Rethinking Social Exclusion. London: Sage. 
Wood, H. and Skeggs, B. (2020) Clap for carers? For care gratitude to care justice. European 
Journal of Cultural Studies. 23(4) 641-647. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1367549420928362  
Woodward, A (2020) Biden to deliver Thanksgiving address to discuss ‘shared sacrifices’ during 
pandemic. The Independent. Available at: 







Žižek, S (2008) Violence. London: Profile. 
Endnotes 
 
i It is important to note that in several countries like the UK, how the government has recorded Covid-
19 related deaths has generated some controversy (Briggs, et al 2021). This is because Covid deaths are 
recorded as dying within 28 days of testing positive for Covid-19, failing to distinguish between those 
that died of Covid-19 or died with it. 
 
